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I.  THE CONFERENCE AND THE AUTHORS 
 
In 2000, I chose to mark the 25th anniversary by a personal project to complement the formal 
conference on the topic of the Whitlam years held later in the year on the specific anniversary. 
 
As President of APSA in that momentous year, I chaired the committee which organised the 
conference that year, held amid damp conditions at the Canberra CAE.  The  conference 
occurred in the hothouse environment of July 1975, a period of unprecedented levels of political 
uncertainty.  Indeed, the very title of the conference, “The First Thousand Days of Labor” 
devised by John Power inadvertently begged a momentous question: Would Whitlam last 
beyond his first thousand days?  Answer – just, 1074. 
 
The attendance at the conference, over 400 including the down-town public servants, was also 
abnormally large.  Finally, the format of the conference, squeezing all contributors into a 
straight-jacket of a single theme, was also an innovation – and never repeated because some 
vocal groups felt disenfranchised by its intellectual parochialism. 
 
These special characteristics of the conference justify this exercise in retrospectivity.   It fits into 
a theme of reviewing Australian federalism since 1975 was such a cataclysmic year.  It was a 
mirror of where the Whitlam government was taking the public policy agenda – towards 
institutional reforms in the public service, reaching into local and regional communities, 
creating new slants on federalism and engaging in an activist and independent foreign policy 
(not least with respect to East Timor). 
 
It was also engaging the scholarly attention of a wide variety of participants not normally much 
in evidence at APSA conferences, including senior administrators, serving politicians 
journalists, union officials and ministerial staff.   Some of these have faded into relative 
obscurity or joined their ancestors, but the list of  “then/now” occupations in the Appendices 
suggest an unusual diversity of backgrounds at the time and subsequent to the conference. 
 
I decided to send the conference contributors a copy of their original papers and respond to the 
questions of how much things have changed since they wrote and how accurate were any 
predictions and analyses they offered.  What did the differences tell us about thet state of the 
discipline of political science then and now. 
 
Kate Wilson took on the herculean but ultimately rewarding task of tracking down the 
participants and inviting them to judge the continuing relevance of their papers and the extent to 
which the papers reflected the temper of the times and of the discipline of political science.  
Many authors remain affiliated with universities, some in semi-retirement or doing slightly 
different things; some are doing very different things and some are no longer with us.   Some 
declined to comment because they were no longer “in the trade”, some were, but literally had 
“no comment”; several were obviously enthusiastic about the task and some a touch 
embarrassed.   
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Few of the authors we approached gave much attention to the disciplinary aspects of the task, 
commenting instead on the substance of the issues they had discussed in 1975. This was typical 
of where Australian political studies was at the time,  broadly descriptive, practical and not at all 
scientific. 
 
The scholarly content of the papers was best described by DAVID CORBETT:   
 
 
The 1975 conference papers were time-bound parish-pump stuff, like what a lot of what political 
scientists used to do and still do, though none the worse for that… what sort of political 
scientists were we in those days?  
 
I never used the word ‘discourse’, I didn’t mention post-Fordism (never having heard it then, 
and most uncertain as to what it is even now).  I didn’t mention restructuring, though I well might 
have done…There were other glaring omissions.  Not a word about globalisation,  
bench-marking or empowerment.  Nor did we claim to have made a paradigm shift, or to have 
been thinking outside the box, or to have leveraged a game plan for a customer-focussed 
organisational culture.   
 
Think of it!  
 
And think how much better off we are, now that all of us are familiar with these vital concepts.  
The old days were very bad.   
 
The future lies ahead, as Mort Sahl once said. 
 
The papers are arranged as they were in 1975 – in four sections :  “Government, Parliament and 
Parliamentarians”, “Machinery of Government”, ‘”Federalism” and “Public Policy.  A fifth 
section,  on international relations could not be sustained in this retrospective as few authors 
could be contacted who had any interest in reviewing what they had written that long ago and 
many had not survived.   Hard copies of this retrospective  were tabled at the 2000 APSA 
conference. 
 
The original 1975 papers were  photocopied and bound into two volumes with the modest 
technology then available and can still be found in many university libraries which received free 
copies from APSA.   They will be catalogued as “The First Thousand Days of Labor” perhaps 
with attrributions to compilers Scott,Richardson, Power and Wettenhall. 
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II.  GOVERNMENT, PARLIAMENT AND PARLIAMENTARIANS 
 
BOB SMITH and PATRICK WELLER were linked to the Coombs Commission team and continue 
a close interest in national government;  
 
The Impossibility of Party Government—a comment 
Reflecting on the experience of the Whitlam government is like surveying a half built ruin. 
Twenty-five years on it is essential to acknowledge failed hopes, youthful embarrassments, 
abandoned experiments and episodes of political and bureaucratic behaviour still memorable 
for their ineffectiveness. However, like a grand ruin, the record of the Whitlam government has 
some startlingly intact and contemporary pieces. 
 
Our paper in 1975 explored the ability of a reforming party to take charge of government. We 
concluded that examining the ability of parties to take charge ‘leads directly to a new 
confrontation with the complex policy-making process and the role that parties play within it’. 
This comment starts from the paper’s conclusion.   
 
However, it should be declared at the outset that the comment reflects also a change in 
standpoint. In 1975 much of our interest and experience was in and around political parties; 
looking back from 2000 much of our relevant experience has been in and around the public 
sector.  
   
We cover four issues: 
• Understanding policy processes and the role of government 
• The changing context in which Australian federal governments work 
• Whitlam era innovations with continuing currency 
• Continuing issues.  
First, we now have more intellectual equipment with which to analyse policy processes. But we 
also have more modest hopes about the role of government and about our ability to use 
analysis as a guide to change and reform. In 1975 big and bureaucratic government was 
accepted. Many commentators regarded changing government practices to reflect the platform 
and aspirations of Whitlam Labor as a feasible challenge. Labor oppositions regarded learning 
the lessons of the Whitlam era as good preparation for government up to the first years of the 
Hawke government. Academically ‘public policy’ was a label still looking for a field. Management 
in government had yet to become controversial let alone widespread.  
 
Now we have burgeoning literatures in public policy and management. These are accompanied 
by deep divisions of opinion about both the range of appropriate government activity and the 
means by which governments should seek to apply policy. Further, after putting the public 
sector and its supporters under great pressure, neo liberal agendas have themselves lost much 
of their drive. In 2000, analysis of and in the public sector tends to inform scepticism rather than 
enthusiasm. 
 
Second, the national government continues to share power uncomfortably with the states while 
confronting a disturbed international environment, especially in South East Asia and the Pacific. 
Further, the intertwining of global and local economic forces distributes opportunities and 
threats differentially throughout Australian society. Agendas to use the private and community 
sectors to deliver government policy compete with demands for direct use of the public sector to 
underpin communities under threat. Further, increased diversity within Australian society 
presents threats as well as opportunities. Political parties grapple with a world in which winning 
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government means handling the impacts of external forces while providing leadership to an 
increasingly differentiated domestic society. 
 
Third, despite the changes mentioned above, some of the tools of government available to 
electorally successful parties owe their significance to initiatives in the Whitlam era. Whitlam 
and his colleagues prepared hard for government. Further, while the government respected the 
role of the public service, it wished to make changes. Unlike many social democratic reformers 
in the UK it did not take the public service for granted as a means of implementing change. To 
Whitlam, being in charge meant more than providing ministerial blessing to official agendas. 
 
Taken together the initiatives outlined in the full paper formed a broad and largely unintegrated 
agenda to improve political leadership of the public sector and to modernise the way the public 
sector was run. Current agendas extend in directions people in the 1970s could not envisage. 
However, the number of initiatives from the 1970s with continuing currency is testament not 
only to the long time periods involved in implementing extensive change in the public sector but 
also to the substance in amongst the froth. 
 
Fourth, amongst continuing issues two stand out. First, the Whitlam government marked the 
high water mark of confidence in the effectiveness of government action. In many respects the 
recent neo liberal experiments drew strength from the disillusionment generated by the Whitlam 
government’s inability to implement its program in an orderly fashion. Probing the spectacular 
failures of an ambitious government led easily enough to a radical reworking of expectations 
about what governments could and should do. It is acknowledged that neo liberal agendas 
depended on much more than this. But Whitlam era failures in policy and management provided 
and continue to provide dramatic reminders of how good intentions can lead to bad results. In 
the post neo liberal sorting out of values and means it is possible that new generations of 
activists will draw inspiration from the intentions of the Whitlam period as they search also for 
more effective means of implementation. 
 
This leads directly to the second prominent continuing issue. How elected ministers relate to 
appointed officials in a tight Westminster derived executive in times of rapid external and 
internal change deserves more thorough consideration in public discussion than it is receiving. 
Whether governments want to do a lot or a little they depend on official help. 
 
The idea of a permanent and continuing public service emerged from the Northcote Trevelyan 
report in Britain in the middle of the nineteenth century as a response to changing pressures of 
work in government. Many initiatives in the 1970s depended on the assumption that opening up 
the public sector would make it work better. Neo liberal initiatives asserted that the problem was 
the public sector itself. Now perhaps we are back to asking what we want governments to do 
and how they can best do it. Questions of purpose and capability intertwine. It is suggested that, 
as in earlier times, these questions need political as well as management answers. Public 
sectors need political leadership. But how such leadership is given needs to be debated anew. 
It has been an easy to drift into partisan appointments at official level as a response to 
bureaucratic obduracy. However, disappointment with the performance of partisan appointees 
has generated questions about the need to raise the priority given to capability. The ability of 
stripped down public sectors to provide help to governments elected in reaction to neo liberal 
agendas further extends the question of capability. 
 
and IAN MCPHEE and JOHN BUTTON were asked to provide a report on their impressions of 
being parliamentarians under Whitlam.  Ian McPhee reports that   
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one of my vivid recollections of the discussion which followed the presentation was the lack of 
real interest by the political science fraternity in the topic.  If that is still true, it is little wonder 
that the effectiveness of our democracy is unravelling. 
 
McPhee was, however, proud of the percipience of his own remarks:   
 
For the first time in my life, I would not change a word of what I said 25 years ago.  As a political 
science critique, I believe it to be accurate.  An examination of the same criteria for later 
governments would produce quite varied criticisms.  The picture would be uneven.  Most would 
be criticised more than was Whitlam’s, the Howard Government faring worst, I would expect, on 
most criteria. 
 
Button was able to draw a vivid account from his perspective as a government back-bencher as 
well as a later senior Minister.  He captures superbly the sense of grandness and chaos of the 
era: 
 
My paper to the 1975 APSA Conference attempted to deal with two topics reflected in the title 
(‘Parliament Under Labor’) and the sub-title (‘Reflections of a New Member of Parliament”).  So 
in a way it blurred two issues. 
 
The title was an unusual one for an APSA Conference.  There hadn’t been a ‘Parliament Under 
Labor’ for 23 years before December 1972.  A Labor Government was an unusual 
phenomenon, worthy of some consideration by students of the political system. 
 
Since 1975 there have been 13 years of Labor Governments.  Whether the institution of 
parliament has changed much is a different matter.  My original paper observed the government 
and the parliamentary process with ‘the innocent eye of a newcomer’.  In 1975 the ‘innocence’ 
was already tinged with scepticism.  That’s because after years as a foot soldier of a party in 
Opposition one arrives in parliament with high aspirations, even idealism.  These are fragile 
flowers, easily crushed, in the absence of protective wrappings.  A healthy scepticism serves 
this purpose. 
 
1975 was, of course, a different century and a very different political landscape.  In hindsight the 
Whitlam Government represented a watershed in Australian politics of the second half of the 
20th Century and in the nature and composition of the Labor Party. 
 
It has been suggested by the American historian, George Lukacs, that the 20th Century really 
began in 1914 with the start of the Great War and ended with the collapse of Soviet 
Communism in 1989.  The intervening period was dominated by two great ‘peoples’ wars, and 
competition between the powerful ideologies of Fascism and Communism. 
 
The Whitlam Government of 1972-75 belonged very much in the political and cultural mould of 
that century.  The continuation of the Cold War and emotional commitments to tottering 
ideologies impinged profoundly on the philosophy and attitudes of those who formed the first 
Labor Government after 23 years in opposition. 
 
Ideological positions in the Labor Caucus were affected by attachments to class, tenuous 
influences of Catholicism and Marxist sympathies (mostly a legacy of the Labor split), trade 
union politics, resistance to change and efforts by the Left to identify with perceived new radical 
causes such as environmentalism and urban development.  There were even alliances which 
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transcended positions on the political spectrum, such as the group named LOGS, an acronym 
standing for ‘Labor’s Old Guard Socialists’, a group which seemed to revolve round resistance 
to ‘smooth talkers’ like Gough Whitlam. 
 
Whitlam’s achievement was to break the mould of the past, firstly by being elected and 
secondly by having created new policy agendas in his period in Opposition, leading up to the 
election of 1972. 
 
The policy agenda embraced a new and different view of Australia’s role in the Asia/Pacific 
region which went beyond the paradigm of the Cold War.  It included an enlarged perspective of 
the role of the Commonwealth Government in education, health, infrastructure development, 
law reform and urban issues.  In a sense it was ‘catch-up’ politics mulled over in the wilderness, 
an amalgam of dusted off ‘gas and water’ socialism, institutional modernisation and Libertarian 
values.  It was a program which broadened labour’s appeal beyond its traditional class base, 
capturing support from emerging political and cultural elites. 
 
This new agenda was unpopular with conservatives and even some older members of the 
Parliamentary Labor Party.  Recognition of China, the ending of involvement in the Vietnam 
War and Conscription, moves towards equal pay for women and the introduction of a universal 
health service were all issues which united the Labor Party in government.  It was the issues 
involving attitudes influenced by the Cold War and nurtured in Opposition which quickly became 
divisive.  These included the American alliance, industrial relations, wages policy, tariff cuts, 
fiscal policy and later rising unemployment. 
 
In summary Whitlam endowed the Labor Party with a new and perhaps unrealistic view of the 
possibilities of Parliamentary Government.  At the same time he was a pragmatist rejecting the 
ideological ‘purity’ of the past and presiding over the ‘middle classing’ of the ALP. 
 
The changes which took place, the tensions of transition were reflected in the behaviour of 
politicians on both sides of parliament.  Clyde Cameron, a Labor traditionalist, enjoyed himself 
rashly chiding the Conservative Opposition for ‘born to rule’ attitudes.  The Opposition of 1975 
characterised the Government as incompetent; people who had no natural understanding of 
governance.  In the Senate, Reg Withers (later to become Leader of the Opposition) whose 
father had been a State Labor politician, indicated his preference for Labor politicians in the 
style of the Calwell era.  He exploited tensions within the Labor Party with his attacks on the 
new university-educated Labor Senators.  ‘My father’, he would say, ‘would turn in his grave at 
the sight of you rotten parlour pinks over there.  He was a real Labor man, not like you lot’. 
 
There are of course reflections benefiting from the wisdom of hindsight which lends perspective 
if nothing else.  Nobody in the early 1970’s was able to foresee the forces which were destined 
to reshape the nature of politics both internationally and in Australia.  The collapse of 
Communism, the triumph of American capitalism and the technological breakthroughs which 
hastened Globalisation were unimaginable.  If these things had been foreseen would Whitlam’s 
agenda have been different?  Probably not much.  It’s possible, however, that the ideological 
tensions within the Labor Party would have been exacerbated. 
 
The Whitlam Government, which suffered from the deadly combination of bad luck and bad 
management, is often characterised as having been strong on its program, weak on execution.  
The first suggestion is arguable, the second suggestion is an understatement.  I hinted at this in 
my 1975 paper:  ‘In December 1972 there was a feeling of much to be done, old scores needing 
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to be settled, new policies implemented, and new methods of Government adopted.  Hence the 
promise of open Government, and the proliferation of ministerial advisers and staff:  a new 
world to redress the balance of the old.  Much of this, of course, reflects the personal political 
style, energy and grasp of detail of the Prime Minister.  In part it reflects a pent-up impatience 
build up over long years in opposition’. 
 
All these matters and particularly the dominance and personality of the Prime Minister 
exacerbated the problems.  I recall telling a psychiatrist friend in 1975 about the way the Prime 
Minister treated some of his ministerial colleagues.  My friend was astonished.  ‘He seems’, my 
friend said, ’weak on interpersonal relations’.  Later, looking back on this period, I wrote: 
 
To a newcomer the Whitlam government seemed something of a mess.  There was an air of 
magnificent chaos.  Observing it at close quarters one hovered between admiration and dismay.  
Key ministers, sometimes very good ones, were constantly changing positions.  Others were 
dropped altogether.  Newcomers of mediocre calibre were brought in.  In caucus there were 
frequent brawls between ministers.  Only six ministers out of twenty-seven kept the same job 
for the entire three-year period.  Manufacturing industry was not a priority.  It had four ministers 
in succession.  The government seemed to lurch from crisis to crisis.  The progressive foreign 
policy decisions, the establishment of a national health service, the sweeping reforms in 
education were lost sight of.  Storm clouds obscured these enlightened initiatives.  The 
corridors of old Parliament House were alive with gossip.  One needed an interpreter to 
understand it all.  Standing in King’s Hall outside the Senate chamber I noticed a beautiful 
woman walking past.  ‘Who’s that?’ I asked Jim McClelland. 
 
‘That, son,’ he replied, ‘is our Watergate.  She’s called Junie Morosi.’ 
 
Bemused, I wandered off when no further explanation seemed forthcoming.  As time went past 
countless mysteries like this one were slowly unravelled. 
 
All this reveals is the uniqueness of the Whitlam Government, of Parliament under Labor 
between 1972 and 1875.  I’m reminded of a character in a novel of Stendahl who ‘found himself 
in the middle of the Battle of Waterloo without realising he was taking part in a cataclysmic 
event’.  Somehow the Whitlam Government seemed like that. 
 
One suspects that the Parliamentary Labor Parties of earlier times were more socially and 
culturally homogenous, though often ideologically divided.  The uniqueness is also illustrated by 
a comparison with the Labor Party at the start of this new century.  Politics in 1975 involved 
some ideology, some passion.  The contemporary Labor party has powerful factions (using the 
labels ‘Left’ and ‘Right’) but no real ideological differences and not much passion.  The 
Parliamentary Labor Party is less representative of a broad spectrum of community 
backgrounds.  Tribalism has replace ideology.  Pragmatism, of the Whitlam variety, has 
mutated into opportunism.  ‘Parliament Under Labor’ in 1972-1975 has no likely point of 
comparison since then or in the foreseeable future. 
 
What of the institution of Parliament?  In 1975 Parliament met in the Old (and temporary) 
Parliament House.  It was cluttered, the roof sometimes leaked, the public spaces were small 
and overcrowded.  Nonetheless it had a certain neo-colonial charm about it.  This emanated 
from the architecture, the rose gardens where on special occasions members strolled like 
expatriates in Colonial India listening to the music of a brass band, and the magnificent vista 
across the lake.  It seemed an appropriate setting for governments of limited achievement. 
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The ‘old’ Parliament House had a ‘democratic’ ambience about it although there were in 1975 
few women members.  The democratic feel came about largely because of Kings Hall which 
was central to the building in that one inevitably crossed it in moving from the Senate side to the 
House of Representatives side. 
 
King’s Hall was the place where the public intruded into the private world of politicians.  It was 
the agora of the old parliament’s idea of itself as a democratic institution.  Access was 
unrestricted.  Pensioner groups, delegates from regional centres, school children, tourists and 
protesters mingled like shoals of fish in a giant pond.  Politicians darted in and out like goldfish 
testing the water; pausing in a warm spot, retreating from cold and hostile eddies.  Alan Reid 
watched it all from behind the Magna Carta.  (‘As it Happened: 1998). 
 
During the period of the Whitlam Government both sides of politics seemed bemused by the 
new roles in which they had been cast.  For long-serving Labor members there seemed to be 
an uneasy euphoria, for Conservative members profound shock at finding themselves in 
Opposition after 23 years.  Evan after the defeat of the Government Senator Withers who 
became leader of the Fraser Government in the Senate assured me he’d do what he could to 
help me ‘because you are now where you belong: in Opposition’.  Longer terms of subsequent 
governments have probably reduced those proprietorial attitudes on both sides of politics. 
 
The move to the new and permanent Parliament House was necessary.  It was also a mistake.  
From Capital Hill, the building dominates Canberra, itself a mistake made by an earlier 
generation of compromising politicians.  Mussolini would have been proud of the building.  As 
the American travel writer Pico lyer has put it ‘The new centre of Government looks like nothing 
so much as another of the countries sparkling new hotels’.  It has, however, a different function.  
It’s the centre of Government of a country with a strong democratic tradition. 
 
The new Parliament House relies on segregationist principles.  Politicians are segregated from 
the public (there is no King’s Hall equivalent), Ministers (the Ministerial Wing) from 
Backbenchers.  The courtyards are enclosed, the Cabinet Room a windowless bunker. 
 
What about the proceedings of Parliament?  It has always relied for its public profile on the 
talents and performances of its leading parliamentarians.  They give it a public character.  But 
behind the scenes not much has changed since 1975.  The increasing complexity of political 
issues means that the record legislative pace set by the Whitlam government has continued.  
Divisions are more time wasting than ever because of the sheer size of the building.  The 
Senate Estimates Committees have become more prominent but other Committee 
arrangements seem to have changed little.  The evolution of parliamentary procedures one 
hoped for in 1975 is an extremely slow process if, in fact, it is proceeding at all. 
Perhaps the hotel analogy of Pico lyer suits the new generation of politicians.  On one side 
predominantly refugees from the accounting and finance sector, on the other middle-class 
apparatchiks from politicians’ offices and trade unions.  The managerial revolution is alive and 
well on Capital Hill.  Amongst them there are few who could be described as stylish or witty.  
Few wits: as an observer I indulge in some nostalgia for the passion, the style, even the 
managerial shortcomings of Parliament under Labor at the time of the Whitlam Government. 
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III.   RECONSTRUCTING THE MACHINERY 
 
This was the time when the idea of dramatic reconstruction of the machinery of government 
came into vogue, not to downsize government as is too often the case more recently, but to 
make it more effective in creating change and improving society.  It was also a time when ideas 
were sought from outsiders rather than wisdom assumed to reside in the collective intelligence 
of existing bureaucrats and politicians. 
 
DAVID CORBETT sets a wider context in his response on South Australia:   
 
The report my paper described as something of a trend-setter.  Don Dunstan foresaw benefit to 
the public from enquiring into and then shaking up parts of the public sector, and in this he was 
followed by Hamer (the Bland report – APSA paper by Jean Holmes), Whitlam (Coombs –  
paper by  Peter Bailey) and Wran (Wilenski – paper by Gerry Gleason). … 
 
The Report was regarded as rather conservative compared, for example, with Wilenski’s, but 
then ours was substantially adopted and implemented whereas a large proportion of Peter 
Wilenski’s recommendations were adopted en block (notably by Gerry Gleason, head of the 
Premier’s Department , with Premier Wran letting it happen.  Bland’s report was reactionary 
compared with ours.  
 
The Report of the Coombs Royal Commission was, like ours, a mixture of some novelty and a 
lot of tradition.  Coombs and his colleagues, however, had the misfortune to miss the Whitlam 
bus and reported to the Fraser government which was not much interested in public sector 
reform. 
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GERRY GLEASON, writing from the perspective of someone with continuous engagement in 
public sector management, offered an in-depth response on Wilenski’s report on NSW: 
 
1. This was a review of the machinery of government in NSW carried out in an unusual way in 
that it involved Ministers, public servants and up to 50 business men on various 
committees. Such a review was manageable in a State administration but probably would 
not be suitable for in the Federal arena. 
 
2. The review was directed at revitalizing an administration where the government had been in 
office for ten years and the new Premier had firm ideas that dead wood could be pruned 
and economies could be effected by restructuring departments and by trying to ensure that 
functions could be eliminated where possible. 
 
3. One advantage of this review was that it enabled Ministers and public servants to work 
together. This did help to break down rivalries between administrations although naturally 
everybody was trying to look after his or her empire. 
 
Outcomes: 
4. The most positive outcome form the review was the Cabinet restructuring and the attempt 
(based on Ontario) to streamline the operations of Cabinet. The government only stayed in 
office for about 18 months but in that period they did try to make this work. 
 
5. When Labor came to office the same cabinet system was adopted but with one major 
exception, namely that instead of matters being processed through the sub-committees of 
the Cabinet, Premier Wran took the view that it was preferable to have all matters go to 
Cabinet and then refer them back to the committees where further discussion was 
desirable. 
 
6. The new structure provided for a Policies and Priorities Committee made up of the Premier 
and his senior Ministers. This Committee did work effectively during the Wran era. It was 
used really as an Executive of Cabinet and came to be accepted by other members as truly 
an executive at which major decision were going to be made. 
 
7. These Cabinet sub-committees resulted in Ministers being required to work together in a 
more collegiate way. It is my experience that Ministers really do not like working together 
and this at least alleviated that problem. 
 
8. Another important outcome was the requirement for corporate plans and management 
audits. This may seem “old hat” today where the emphasis has now changed to business 
plans and business strategies. At the time, however, it was an important change to 
departments administration. 
 
9. There was also the proposal that there should be management audits of departments and 
agencies. This was effected through the Public Service Board. This also has now been 
over-run by Treasury supervision of business plans, budgets and strategies and also by the 
new intrusive role of Auditor-Generals in assessing the performance of departments. 
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Retrospect: 
 
10. In retrospect, the attempt to make Cabinet more efficient and effective was a good one and 
had some good results. Anecdotal stories abound about Federal and State Cabinets and 
the inefficient ways in which they operate and the way in which certain decisions are made. 
 
11. Requiring Ministers and Heads of Departments to work in a cooperative fashion had a good 
impact. 
 
12. The changes that were made did not result from any particular theory of administration. 
Over the past 20 years when there have been Cabinet reshuffles and changes of 
administrative arrangement I am amazed at the rationales often presented or Premiers or 
Prime Ministers for such re-arrangements. The fact is, Prime Ministers and Premiers are 
saddled with Ministers and they just have to make the best they can do. 
 
This enquiry moved away from traditional enquiries where there was a preoccupation with 
inputs to administration rather than outputs. Successful enquiries across the States and 
federally had concentrated on matters such as recruitment, training, economy and efficiency. 
We have now moved on from there. There was no discussion at this stage of economic 
rationalism and their approach to administration. 
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JEAN HOLMES made the following comments on Bland: 
In terms of the test of time and in the Victorian context, the concluding paragraphs of my 
somewhat wordy and turgid paper (probably a consequence of immersing myself in the Bland 
Enquiry Reports) proved singularly prophetic by the end of the Cain Labor government period in 
1992. In the early 1970’s Sir Henry Bland was highly critical of the state’s ‘disorderly 
organizational structure’; he was equally insistent that the only effective public sector reform 
process was one which placed the discharge of the functions of government under the direction 
of Cabinet Ministers in charge of departments staffed according to clear public service 
directives. 
 
In 1975 I suggested that administrative reforms which pushed centralized ministerialisation too 
strongly in the Victorian context might well result in policies as dysfunctional as those which 
emerged from the prevailing fragmented structures – the Tricontinental merchant bank debacle 
in 1989-90 which was to cost Victorian governments a staggering 2.5 billion plus in 
irrecoverable losses was all too poignant proof of my reservations. 
 
 
My 1975 paper addressed issues in Victorian government only. The Cain govt’s administrative 
reforms on assuming office in 1982 put an emphasis on strong corporate management 
structures under firm Ministerial direction; responsibility for  policy formulation and direction, 
overall control and accountability was all to be vested in the ministry. These reforms owed much 
to the Bland recommendations for direct ministerial control as the pathway to administrative 
efficiency. 
 
Cain Labor also intended to implement the visionary economic policies proposed by the Chifley 
post-war federal Labor government.  The ideological fervour of their first policy document with 
their emphasis on government generated resources in quantities sufficient to meet Labor’s 
social justice goals seems very reminiscent to me of the first hundred days euphoria of the 
Whitlam government era. The question I posed then concerned the outcomes of the Cain years, 
and seems to me to be as equally relevant to the Whitlam federal Labor government’s record.  
Perhaps it is time to answer the question from other than the perspective of party conflict.: 
 
“How did a government so convinced of the merit of its economic and financial reforms, and of 
the moral worth of its program for social change fall into such disarray?” 
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IV.    RECONSTRUCTING FEDERALISM 
 
In her broad-ranging 1975 paper on federalism, Joan Rydon indicated the significance of party 
systems for the understanding of the nature of conflicts then dominating the political landscape.  
In retrospect, she suggested that her remarks then had stood the test of time although there had 
been no confrontation on the same scale as those of the Whitlam years.   The reallocative effects 
of the GST were identified as the major engine of change for the future. 
 
Several papers in 1975 dealt with the specifics of Commonwealth-State relations, all reflecting 
on the sense of adventure and uncontrolled enthusiasm for change.  The responses from 
authors share a common sense of disappointment with echoes of Wildavsky’s famous 
implementation study. 
 
BRUCE DAVIS on the Bell Bay Railway typifies the tone: 
 
The Bell Bay Railway Revisited 
 
Those who warily tread the slippery slopes between academia and part-time policy advice 
within government are well aware of the enormous gap that often exists between political 
rhetoric and administrative reality.  They are even more alert to the dangers of ‘fast-tracking’ 
development, where normal safeguards are swept away in the haste for expedient ends, usually 
resulting in disaster of one form or another.  Nowhere is this better illustrated than in Tasmania, 
where the Bell Bay railway debacle, the Gordon-below-Franklin Dam disaster and the Wesley 
Vale pulp mill proposal shows the trend continues, whatever political party is in power at the 
time. 
 
The Bell Bay railway proposal was a classis example of State expediency, hoping to cash in on 
the tranche of Federal funds the Whitlam Labour government made available for regional 
development in the early 1970’s.  Neither government was interested in niceties, both wanted to 
push ahead virtually irrespective of opinion and with little sense of priorities.  It is not surprising 
therefore, that both sides conjured project estimates out of thin air, that both sides thought they 
were talking about similar things, when there were significant differences in projected figures 
and nobody had actually carried out detailed investigations of the proposed route of the railway 
line.  The end result was that construction crews had to blast through solid rock and cost 
estimates were blown to smithereens.  The post-mortems appeared salutary at the time, but 
have been ignored on several occasions since.  
 
Looking back, it is difficult to recapture the spirit of change and adventure the Whitlam era 
invoked; it certainly was ‘time’ for new horizons, but in the flurry of initiatives and spending 
which ensued, chaos gradually arose, aided by entrenched interest, and the dream faded.  At 
State levels competition for development and inability to mange the federal funds provided led 
to enormous waste, so little was achieved.  Yet some ideas did take root; for example the notion 
that the Commonwealth should be involved in environment affairs and that social programs had 
to differentiate according to specific needs.  But regional development proved too costly relative 
to achievement, besides State governments argued they should handle regional affairs.  It was 
a brave era one remembers with affection, even if the outcomes were less than Australian s 
hoped. 
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Could the Bell Bay railway debacle occur in today’s world?  
 
 Yes, but in a different form, if one takes the recent Oceanport saga in Tasmania as an 
example.  Here all faith was placed in a private enterprise solution, without anyone doing the 
initial homework to check out the proponents, the principal executive turning out to be a multiple 
bankrupt.  It was only when the checks and balances of the Resource Planning and 
Development Commission were wheeled in, that the earlier errors by Ministers and some State 
agencies were revealed. 
 
In terms of Australian political studies, the paper about the Bell Bay railway reveals the limited 
methodological and theoretical perspective’s of the times.  It was a straight forward piece of 
research using case-study methods, with the end lessons falling out of the narrative.  Today we 
would have all the armoury of policy studies at our disposal to make more of it, but at the end of 
the day what happens in government continues to be more about peoples perceptions and 
actions than rationalistic evaluation.  That is a lesson we should continue to take to heart. 
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RALPH CHAPMAN’s subtitle to his AAP paper – “ a study of ineffective planning” continues the 
theme. 
 
My paper on “The Australian Assistance Plan: A Study of Ineffective Planning” voiced my 
disappointment that an opportunity had been missed. It is not easy to reconstruct for anyone 
not involved at the time the surge of optimism felt by those interested in social policy. The 
election of the Whitlam government after 23 years of Coalition government (but more 
particularly the disastrous six years after Menzies, with Holt, Gorton and McMahon) came as a 
breath of fresh air. Not only did it seem to be the Australian aftermath of the American and 
European reform movements culminating in 1968, it also reflected an Australian electorate that 
wanted to be part of the decision making processes. 
 
Whitlam has characterised the emphasis of his social policies in favour of community 
participation as “the doctrine of positive equality”. (G. Whitlam, The Whitlam Government 1972-
1975, Viking Penguin Books Ringwood Victoria 1985:p.3.) Participation was important because 
in his view the quality of life was not measured by what an individual could purchase but rather 
what could be provided by the combined resources of the community. My paper responded to 
what I saw as the distortions of this vision as the Social Commission set to work on the 
Australian Assistance Plan and its implementation. 
 
The aim of the Plan was not to provide service but to put the policies in place by developing 
objectives, goals and evaluation for social planning at the community level. I isolated three 
reasons for poor achievement which I think are still relevant today in many areas in which the 
States have constitutional responsibility but the Commonwealth has invaded through the 
problematic separation of policy and implementation (the old policy / administration dichotomy). 
This opportunity has been provided to the Commonwealth by its control of the purse strings 
and, until recently, the lack of any desire to limit this control.  Examples of this phenomenon 
have been found mostly in areas such as social welfare, health and education but today it has 
spread to transport, policing, company law, family law, environment and agriculture amongst 
others. The latter areas in particular have been subjected to considerable policy pressure 
through inter-jurisdictional ministerial councils. (IJMC. I have elsewhere called these 
‘moderating institutions’. “Intergovernmental forums and the policy process” in Brian Galligan 
(ed.) Comparative State Politics, Melbourne, Longman Cheshire 1988). 
 
Dividing the tasks of policy making and planning from implementation not only in different 
organizations but also between Commonwealth and State bureaucracies remains a major 
problem of federation. The idea was not started by Whitlam, in a much more modest fashion it 
began under Menzies in post compulsory education policy. The establishment of such 
arrangements made uncritically rapid progress during the Whitlam period and has carried on 
since then as States have been subjected to external demands for ‘national’ policies  in 
practically everything they do.  However, the Whitlam government exacerbated the situation by 
not trusting the capacity of the Commonwealth public service to adapt to these new demands 
and setting up commissions outside the service to formulate and monitor their policies. As I 
noted in my AAP paper this led to much uncertainty because the commissions did not have 
resources to follow through all their tasks and had to rely on Commonwealth and State line 
departments. 
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In addition, there was a sense of urgency to get things done after waiting so long for the 
opportunity. “Short-termism” has become a matter of cynical expectation today but after23 
years of conservative, relatively slow moving Commonwealth government activity it was 
something of a culture shock to all concerned in 1972. This was not only the case for the 
Commonwealth bureaucracy but it was also one of considerable concern for state governments 
and public services. States were not ready for the removal of the strategic political advantages 
that came from allocating resources in their own jurisdictions. They were ever ready to accept 
federal funds but not the directions on how to spend them nor on the dollar for dollar conditions. 
 
One legacy from this period  which may not have occurred so quickly, or perhaps not at all, was 
the emergence of a much more self-confident local government sector. The defacto and de jure 
recognition of their status as a partner with state and commonwealth government in a three 
tiered federal system has made a major contribution to a resurgence of interest in local affairs. 
Communities have realised they can make a difference to their own quality of life. 
 
Unfortunately state and federal politicians have been less than enthusiastic about losing some 
of their power to the community. Participatory programs are now more likely to take the form of 
community consultation once the policy has been formulated rather than the community being 
involved in developing the policy. As a result the preference for universal solutions supplied by 
government or state agencies, irrespective of diverse needs and conditions has dominated 
policy-making with adverse consequences in implementation as competition policy has 
exemplified. (See for example, papers in AJPA 55(2) 1996 and a critique by J. Quiggin “The 
future of Government: Mixed Economy or Minimal state?” AJPA 58(4) 1999:39-53). 
 
The conclusion of my AAP paper is still valid. There has to be mutuality of aims, cooperation 
and goodwill on all sides and proper resources for success in any program of this 
intergovernmental type. These pre-conditions are not likely to exist in a federation where the 
three spheres of government operate adversarially or where the policy is divorced from 
implementation. Whitlam was right when he claimed that the policies of his government were 
about a ‘new federalism’, although perhaps not a federalism for federalists.  The attempt to 
bring local government into the governing system and to create a more cooperative framework 
was laudable but did not succeed for a variety of reasons. One of which is that we are not much 
further along the road to understanding our federation and its intergovernmental relations. I am 
disappointed that the literature of Australian politics now seems to be so much issue and 
management based that the study of and commentary on federalism has almost disappeared. 
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Finally, there are obituaries for two entities caught up in the Whitlamesque enthusiasm for 
creating a viable structure of regions and local governments, seen as a bypass operation to 
defeat the recalcitrance of state governments. 
 
TREVOR AND DAVID KANALEY wrote on Regionalism on the NSW North Coast and report on its 
demise on a predictable pessimistic note: 
 
The Paper’s Basic Proposition 
Over time numerous efforts have been made by the Australian , State and local governments 
to establish regional forms of government and administration on the NSW North Coast.  The 
initiatives have all been based on the need for more efficient and planned use , distribution and 
management of resources. They have ranged from bureaucratic structures to coordinate 
administration of services, to processes for broader community participation (though usually on 
an advisory basis to existing levels of government). 
 
The paper presented to the APSA Conference in 1975 put the position that for “the ‘new 
regionalism’ to be effective, then a single regional organization for the whole North Coast must 
replace the present State and Australian Governments’ organizations”. Such an organization 
would have to be representative  of local interests, rather than imposed by more central 
governments, and adequately resourced.  
 
What has happened to the 1975 ‘New Regionalism’? 
The ‘new regionalism’ models of the NSW and Australian Governments’ in 1975 have all but 
disappeared. The North Coast Region established by the NSW Government in 1972 still exists 
for some, but not all, administrative purposes. The North Coast Regional Advisory Council has 
long gone. 
 
The 1975 Labor Governments attempt to decentralise government, administration of services 
and resources did not continue beyond the time frame of Labor’s period in office. While some 
modest regional programs are presently being undertaken, the central pillars of the 1975 Labor 
Government’s initiatives have been abandoned by both Liberal/National Party and Labor 
Federal governments. 
 
- The Ministry of Urban and Regional Development was abolished 
 
- There is now little attempt to coordinate the provision of Commonwealth Government 
services on a regional basis or to actively undertake local consultation on resource 
allocation issues. (For example, the voice of local interests was not a consideration in 
decisions to close Centrelink offices or restructure and relocate employment services 
in regional Australia). 
- The policy process now only considers regional issues if they have direct impact on 
the ballot box. (A second Sydney airport and workers entitlements on the closure of 
key regional industries, following the National Textiles Ltd. Affair, are examples). The 
Australian government has little, if anything to do  with current North Coast regional 
initiatives… 
 
Conclusion 
As in 1975 it remains true to say that the development of regionalism is a function of common 
community interests, consistent policies, adequate resourcing and time.  On the North Coast, 
regional initiatives continue to develop and die out almost regardless of the policies of more 
central governments. What is lacking now, as it was in 1975, is: 
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- Coherent, consistent and on-going policies by governments and community 
organizations drawing together grass roots private and public sector interests at the 
regional level; 
 
- The willingness of service providers at federal and state levels to devolve 
administration to the regional level through processes involving community 
participation; 
 
- Consistent and on-going local government support and participation; and  
 
- Adequate and on-going resourcing to allow regional policies and programs to be 
implemented. 
 
Where to from here? 
History shows that there is a clear interest in regionalism on the NSW North Coast and most 
particularly in the Northern Rivers. It stops and starts and gets nowhere. Possibly the message 
is that, if regionalism delivered sufficient benefits, it would have happened by now. 
 
It is an indication of the death of regionalism that no political party is presently proposing a 
coherent regional agenda with more decentralised government, administration and resources to 
address this divide between metropolitan and regional Australia. 
 
 20 
 
JON ROBBINS tells a similar story about the end of the Hindmarsh Council. 
 
Hindmarsh - 25 years after 
Hindmarsh no longer exists as an administrative entity.  The local government reform 
proposals, just mooted at the time of the paper, finally took effect in 1995 when Hindmarsh 
merged with the much larger City of Woodville.  The small beachside and quite affluent LGA of 
Henley & Grange, after much resistance, was also merged in 1998 to create the City of Charles 
Sturt. 
 
Not only are the problems of Hindmarsh submerged in the much enlarged City of Charles Sturt 
but the Woodville area with is emphasis on old manufacturing industries has developed 
problems of its own with the contraction and closure of much of its industrial base. Henley & 
Grange continues to have a council branch office.  There is no council presence in Hindmarsh 
other than a branch library. 
 
The Town of Walkerville, the very affluent small LGA, across the parklands from Hindmarsh has 
resisted all attempts at amalgamation.  Privilege defends its interests more effectively than 
poverty. The extent of poverty of Hindmarsh has been reduced by the development of new 
town-house estates on derelict industrial sites and the renovation of the better housing stock.  
With the closure of many industries, particularly those engaged in toxic trades, the inner 
suburban location of Hindmarsh, adjacent to the parklands, has encouraged a mild degree of 
gentrification.  Some of the sites turned out to have toxic residues which generated a campaign 
of political activism among the new residents. 
 
The other notable development in the area has been of entertainment venues - again 
encouraged by the vacant industrial sites.  The Adelaide Entertainment Centre is in Hindmarsh 
and the Soccer Stadium has been upgraded and will act as an Olympic venue.  Just over the 
border in the old Woodville area is the main basketball stadium and to the west of that the West 
Lakes AFL stadium.  While the provision of bread is sometimes in doubt there is an ample 
supply of circuses! The presence of the entertainment venues drawing audiences from the 
entire metro. area and even inter-state decreases the sense of ‘localism’. 
 
There are some residual legacies from the 1972-5 era.  Grants to local government have 
become a standard part of financing and have become less of a vehicle for ‘grantsmanship’.  
60% are general grants fixed by a Grants Commission and many of the specific grants eg. for 
libraries have a formula base. 
 
One other survivor is to disappear this month.  The DURD regions, despite some vicissitudes, 
continued to operate in SA.  The Western Metropolitan Region is about to disband on the 
grounds that the mergers have made it redundant. 
 
There is little focus any more on identifying ‘problem’ areas and treating the problem by 
improving the area.  The main emphasis is on identifying and treating specific categories of 
deprivation. 
 
A curious continuum from the 1972-5 era identified in the original paper is the ultimate victory of 
‘innovation’ and the managers, professionals and consultants who reaped benefit from it, 
regardless of its impact on the problems it was supposed to ameliorate.  The radical-
antibureaucratic element has retreated to environmentalism; the conservative-traditionalists, 
who initially appeared to have won the day with the dismissal of Whitlam, have retired or been 
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made redundant.  The progressive- ‘trendy’ have ultimately triumphed - destabilising all in their 
path, achieving nothing demonstrable but rewarding themselves well along the way. 
 
Symbolic of the trend is the conversion of the old Hindmarsh Council Offices to a High-Tech 
Education Centre run by the S.A. Department of Education in conjunction with the University of 
Adelaide. 
 
Mention might also be made of the Multi-Function Polis - the high-tech urban development to be 
build on contaminated wasteland adjacent to Port Adelaide, another social ‘problem area’ of the 
1970’s.  Millions of dollars spent on astronomical salaries and consultancies and now… nothing. 
 
Local government has seen massive amalgamation, electoral reform, radical administrative 
reform - the result was to be reduced costs, enhanced participation, greater efficiency, 
enhanced functions.  There has been no systematic evaluation but such evidence as is 
available indicates substantial rate rises, lower rates of participation, no increase in functions 
and no apparent improvement in service delivery.  Councillors and particularly mayors now 
receive substantial allowances.  Senior council officers, with salaries linked to the rate base, 
have seen their salaries soar with amalgamation. 
 
The main observation I would make is that there is evolution in all things (most things?) and 
changing urban geography has produced a different set of circumstances in Hindmarsh (and 
elsewhere).  At the same time deliberate structural change, as in the case of local government 
amalgamations, and a changing political and bureaucratic culture, has modified the way the 
‘problems’ are identified and treated. 
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V.   WICKED PUBLIC POLICIES 
 
There were four policy issues discussed in 1975 which have not gone away:  health services, 
income support schemes, industrial relations and tariff reform/ national competition policy.   
Each of the four authors have taken the opportunity to review their contributions: 
 
One of the truly intriguing papers in 1975 was given by a medical practitioner - an activist on the 
General Practitioners Society of Australia.  Here is PETER ARNOLD’s commentary: 
 
Reviewing one’s 25 years-old forecasts is an unexpected privilege. Did they eventuate?  The 
original paper was not short on prophesies about Medibank1, the Australian Medical 
Association, the Royal Australian 7College of General Practitioners, and the GPSA itself.  One 
forecast was hopelessly wrong.   A summary of each forecast follows and then my view of what 
eventuated.  
 
Medibank: 
1. The ‘moral hazard’ of insurance would lead to excessive demands on the health 
services and the federal government would be forced to bring about some forms of 
controls. 
 
Without payment at time of service, Australians have increased their use of health services. The 
public feels entitled to everything ‘free’2. It was argued that unmet need accounted for initial 
growth. Against that is continuing increase, unabated for 25 years. Proof is governments’ 
dampening utilisation by controls on supply—numbers of doctors and hospital beds; and on 
demand—‘user-pay’ contributions for pharmaceuticals, once 50 cents, now exceed $20. 
Government increasingly attempts to stem overutilisation by prosecuting doctors who 
‘overservice’or ‘practise inappropriately’, via the Professional Services Review3. 
 
2. Government controls would interfere with the doctor-patient relationship and influence 
the way in which doctors practise medicine, limiting rather than increasing patients’ 
freedom of access to services . 
 
Bulk-billing and encouragement by Labor of the ‘medical entrepreneurs’, eg Geoffrey Edelsten, 
led to an attitude  of “seeing a doctor”, whichever was on duty, rather than “seeing my doctor”, 
the pre-Medibank norm. The success of ‘free’ clinics led to the collapse of neighbourhood 
practices. It opened the way to ‘vertical integration’, ‘one-stop shopping’ or ‘convenience’ 
medicine. The ‘entrepreneurs’ followed Woolworth’s and Franklin’s with ‘loss-leaders’, namely 
GP services, while reaping profits from pathology, x-rays, ultra-sound and specialist 
consultations. 
 
Early in Medibank’s life, GPSA members had prescriptions over-printed with a warning deeply 
resented by Canberra bureaucrats:  
 
“WARNING: The information on this prescription is processed by government computers and 
may result in invasion of your privacy.”  
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Lo and behold, all prescriptions now issued by the Department state: 
 
 “The information recorded on this form and details advised by the Department of Social 
Security and Veterans’ Affairs will be used to assess your entitlement to benefits under the 
Pharmaceutical benefits Scheme and to determine payments due to pharmacists. The 
collection of the information is authorised by the National Health Act 1953 and is usually 
disclosed to the Commonwealth Department of Human Services and Health.” 
 
3. Government controls on a guaranteed floor price for GPs’ services would lead to 
increased turnover and a correspondingly lower standard of practice. 
 
Before Medibank began, David Cunningham and I wrote an unsigned article, ‘How to rob 
Medibank blind4, in The Australian GP. We wanted it judged by content, not by its authors. It 
was run, in full, by the Sun-Herald across its middle pages. The Minister’s and the AMA’s 
responses were that such things wouldn’t happen in Australia! 
 
Bulk-billing by GPs rose inexorably, reaching close on 90%. Faced with fixed fees, GPs 
increased their through-put of patients. In 1975, a GP was very busy if he averaged 40 patients 
daily. Today, the Professional Services Review criterion for investigation is 85 per day5. 
 
GP diaries in the 1970s commonly provided for 15 minute appointments; current books reserve 
10 minutes. Although ‘measuring quality’ is difficult, it is recognised that the most reliable 
indicator of the quality of general practice is the length of consultation time. 
 
4. Medibank would inexorably widen the gap between private and public care and lead 
inevitability to a two-tier scheme. 
This prophecy is proven by the advantage enjoyed by Australians with private insurance: 
prompt surgical attention. Others meet lengthy waiting times for public hospital admission. 
 
5. Medibank will not live up to expectations because of inherent weaknesses of “free at 
point of service”.  
 
Although Australians relish attending a GP or specialist, and having pathology and x-rays, at no 
charge, there is widespread dissatisfaction with waiting times for ‘free’ hospital services—the 
keystone of Whitlam’s policy6.  
 
The AMA 
Widespread discontent between 1968 and 1987 led to many resignations. Bill Hayden’s 
‘sympathy’ for an AMA threatened by the maverick tactics of the GP Society7 was not 
misplaced. In 1975 I reported our failure to change representation of doctors from a State to a 
‘craft’ basis. Robert Cotton, reporting on it structure, endorsed our views. With the adoption of a 
new constitution in 1988 came a massive and continuing increase in membership8. 
 
The RACGP  
Its political role, always hotly denied, became entrenched with its funding by the federal 
government as the sole training authority for general practice and its involvement in the 1999 
financial understanding with government. 
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The GPSA My signal error lay in forecasting its future success. In 1985, it opened its 
membership to all private doctors and changed its name to Private Doctors of Australia. Its 
numbers and influence have progressively dwindled. 
 
End notes: 
1. I make no attempt to differentiate Medibank from Medicare, its natural successor. My 
1975 comments referred, of course to Medibank; my current comments to Medicare. 
2. Robert Samuelson has called our century "the Age of Entitlement". The Good Life and 
its Discontents: The American Dream in the Age of Entitlement, 1997, Vintage Books 
3. Declaration of interest: as an AMA Federal Councillor in the 1990s, I was on the original 
group which attempted to tighten the legislation and was Chairman of the working party 
in the 1998 review of the legislation. 
4. January 1976 
5. A figure reluctantly agreed to by the AMA 
6. “A Labor government would not set out to nationalise doctors, but it would establish a 
national hospital system.” Address at the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital, 5 July 1968 
7. National Press Club address, October 1973 
8. From 17,000 in 1986 to 27,000 by 1999. Many GPSA/PDA members came to occupy 
high ofice in the new AMA. 
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JIM CUTT and JOHN DIXON, economists both and now continents apart, provided a comment 
which reflected on the “wicked nature” of policy areas involving public spending on social 
security: 
 
This paper remains robustly relevant to contemporary social security policy issues. Its focus 
was on the potential—but not inevitable--trade-off between the equality and efficiency 
dimensions of social security policy. Perhaps indeed the paper was actually before its time, 
because the economists who drove the neo-liberal policy agenda after Whitlam and who 
subsequently came to dominate social security discourses in Australia gave little attention to the 
social security debates engaged by the reforming Whitlam government—to its credit.  
 
The debate was active: remember the startling study by the liberal economist, Ron Henderson, 
in the late 1960s that condemned Australia’s social assistance system; remember Percy 
Harris’s plea to liberalize the means test in order to remove perverse incentives.  
 
Now what the Whitlam government actually decided was another matter. Social security 
benefits were dramatically increased, the means tests were liberalized, and holes in the social 
security safety net were plugged. All very commendable, but equality took precedence over 
efficiency, the heart governed the head, and “doing good” held full sway. Well, the snag is that 
doing good and doing well are inter-related, and it would have been helpful if the hard-nosed 
economists had used some of their economic rationality cudgel to ponder the role of perverse 
incentives in causing poverty traps, costly dependency on public provision, and the erosion of 
incentives to self-sufficiency and dignity.  
 
In any event, our crystal ball—a now crude but then sophisticated dynamic simulation model 
which had an impressive capacity to model past the consequences of past social policies—told 
us that the crunch would come, and that equality and efficiency would emerge as conflicting 
objectives. We were right. But what we were doing--grappling with the dynamics of the 
equality/efficiency trade-offs in social policy—was quite unfashionable for economists then. It 
was also, by the way, unfashionable for, or certainly beyond the grasp of, the social advocates; 
the sociologist in the Ministry of Social Security who read our results dismissed them as 
irrelevant. 
 
It is ironic that the debate is still unfashionable; what happens now is that the equality 
(distributive) implications of economically efficient policies are conveniently ignored. Perhaps 
their incorporation would clutter the presentational elegance of the sophomoric mathematical 
manipulations of the economists at ANU and elsewhere. 
 
Yet we did miss one boat, maybe two. With respect to the first, we chatted about the selectivity 
versus universality principle; we wondered about contributory versus non-contributory 
principles; and we actually engaged the prickly issue of poverty alleviation versus income 
redistribution. But we did not even contemplate the debate on public versus mandatory private 
provision. After Chile lit the flame in 1981, the British and U.S. governments leapt aboard—and 
Australia followed suit. 
 
 26 
 
What about the second boat? Well, we were at pains to emphasize—admittedly in the light of 
the pretty clear historical evidence generated by our model—the conflict between equality and 
efficiency. What we did not stress, but should have at least discussed, is that the two goals 
need not be in conflict. Self-evidently over the longer haul, doing well (efficiency) is a pre-
condition of doing good (equality). The extent of real generosity depends on the fullness of the 
pot; there is not much point in equal shares in nothing. 
 
 But it is also true that intelligently defined social policies can recognize incentive (and dignity) 
matters and contribute directly and positively to economic efficiency; so also if economic 
efficiency policies are to be viable, not to say humane, in the longer run, they had better 
recognize and deal positively with matters of distribution. It remains a sad commentary on the 
social policy debate that this felicitous potential complementarity still does not seem 
interesting—boring perhaps to the efficiency advocates, ideologically compromising to the 
equality folks. The politics of compassion can be integrated with the politics of efficiency; the 
politics of envy cannot. 
 
But we should not end this retrospective comment without acknowledging the contribution of the 
Whitlam government.  The 1972-74 period was a watershed for Australian social security. It 
shed its veneer of residualism. It introduced the foundations of a new model to the global social 
security stage which came to fruition in the 1980s: a public assistance system that could be 
focused on poverty without producing the stigma that reduces take-up rates (the proportion of 
those who enrol in the programs to the eligible target population) to the extent that rendered 
ineffective public assistance programs in Europe and North America because of their Poor Law 
components.  
 
It was a system where selectivity meant affluence testing not poverty testing; a tax-financed 
system that did not over-tax the later Hawke/Keating governments’ will to support those most in 
need; a system where beneficiary expectations were modest in comparison with the high 
income replacement models in Europe, whether corporatist or universalist. This is a distinctive 
legacy of the Whitlam government. 
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RUSSELL LANSBURY offered the following response on industrial relations: 
 
.Has the paper stood the test of time? 
 
I think that the issues in my paper are still central to the political scene today. The three key 
issues which Whitlam promised to tackle are still those facing Beasley. Namely:  the role of 
government in IR, the reform of the IR tribunals and the future of trade unions.   
 
IR was a major problem for the Whitlam government as Cameron presided over (if not 
encouraged) a major wage hike. He was removed largely because he was perceived to have 
failed in this area.  
 
The Hawke government learned from this experience and used the Accord to keep control over 
union wage demands. But the issue of union-ALP relations in regard to IR still remains a key 
problem for Beasley, especially given the disenchantment of the union movement with the 
Accord (which is blamed for a decline in real wages). As my paper in the Drawing Board 
suggests, I believe that any future ALP government will have to reestablish a 'social partnership' 
with the unions in order to gain and hold power. 
 
Link to the retrospective evaluation of the Whitlam government's contribution to public policy? 
 
I think that the failure of the Whitlam goverment to match their promises with performance is still 
haunting the public policy debate concerning IR. One of the enduring legacies of Cameron was 
in the training area. His attempts to get 'active labour market policies' on the agenda of public 
policy. While the government was not successful in achieving its goals in this area, it made 
considerable gains which were later extended by Hawke and Keating. It is an issue which could 
be a 'winner' for Beasley in his attempt to put education and training agenda for the next 
election. 
 
I think that the Whitlam government deserves credit in this area. But it largely failed in the areas 
of wages policy, and reform of the industrial tribunals (which has been a major concern of the 
Howard government). Union amagamations were later achieved in the Hawke era but they did 
not reap the rewards which the Labor movement expected.The sceptre of a 'wages breakout' of 
the kind that occurred under Whitlam and Cameron remains a problem for Beasley and any 
other future Labor leader. 
 
The state of Australian political studies in 1975 compared to now? 
 
This is difficult for me to assess. I think that IR and political studies have not really been very 
well integrated. The U of Qld is probably the only Dept of Political Science where IR issues 
have been seriously integrated into the study of politics (due to people like Paul Boreham and 
Geoff Dow). Yet I think that many scholars in the IR field now draw more heavily on political 
science (and political economy perspectives) than on other disciplines. 
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DAVID CHARLES, then a bureaucrat and now with the Allen Consulting Group, suggests that the 
tariff debate was first stalled under Fraser and then overwhelmed by wider reform: 
 
A Strategy for Tariff Reform reflected the time it was written and the fundamental position of the 
writers which was in support of tariff reform. Following the seminal decision in July 1973 to cut 
tariffs across the board by 25 per cent, the economy had entered into a recession in 1974 and 
this had a major influence on attitudes towards tariff reform.   
 
There was a general loss of faith in its benefits and an exaggeration its costs; for a while the 25 
per cent tariff cut became something of a term of abuse in political discourse. 
 
A separate influence was the experience with the Industry Assistance Commission’s report on 
the automotive industry in 1974 and approaches adopted to the textiles, clothing and footwear 
industries in 1974/75.  This experience suggested that these large, sensitive industries were 
almost certainly going to require special approaches if tariff reform was to apply to them. 
 
Where did the paper have something to say?   
 
The first point is that the paper took the view that the intellectual case for tariff reform in 
Australia was overwhelming — the issue was not whether tariff reform should take place, but 
rather how it should be carried forward.  
 
The second point was that special treatment was needed for large, sensitive industries such as 
automotive and textiles, clothing and footwear.  Such industries because of their size and 
importance both in terms of regions and employment, had the capacity to mobilise a high 
degree of resistance to change and accordingly a sophisticated strategy needed to be 
developed if reform was to occur.  
 
The experience with the automotive industry in 1974 showed that it was not possible in 
Australia at the time to prescribe necessary structural change with the “stroke of a pen”.  
Microeconomic reform at the industry level is an inherently complex and demanding 
undertaking.  The Button plan for the automotive industry introduced in 1984 contained many of 
the characteristics laid down in the 1975 paper for pursuing successful tariff reform. 
 
The third point was that making progress with tariff reform required developing a better public 
presentation of the benefits such reform would bring. It was not enough to present an entirely 
negative case based on the costs that the tariff was imposing on consumers and export 
industries. A more positive case based on expanding the economy growth capacity was 
needed. 
 
The final point is that as the tariff had played a multiplicity of roles, it was likely that other 
instruments would need to be developed if objectives considered valid were to be pursued.   
 
What didn’t the paper see coming?   
 
At the time of writing it was not expected that the whole process of economic reform of which 
tariff reform is a part would go into a holding pattern for most of the period  of the Fraser 
government.  While attempts were made to put major economic reforms on the agenda (the 
Campbell Report on the financial system and the Crawford Report on trade and industry being 
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major examples), there was no real will by the then Prime Minister to proceed and he was not 
pressed by the then Opposition to do so. 
The big bang in terms of economic reform took place in 1983 following the election of the 
Hawke government when it was decided to float the Australian dollar and to move towards full 
financial market deregulation along the lines proposed in the Campbell Report. This 
represented a giant step along the road to integrating the Australian economy into the World 
economy. It opened the way for the tariff reform process which was to follow. 
 
One of the consequences of the integration of the Australian capital market to world capital 
markets was the strength it gave to the ‘voice’ of the capital markets and the financial (and 
Sydney-based) press, especially in the Fairfax press such as the Australian Financial Review 
and the Sydney Morning Herald. The financial press was overwhelmingly in favour of tariff 
reform and some of its leading lights raised tariff reform to a position where it became seen as a 
necessary condition for granting the government a seal of good financial management. 
 
A further important development was the creation of the Business Council of Australia and the 
strong voice achieved within it by the Australian mining industry which was itself a powerful 
supporter of tariff reform. 
 
In practice, the Button car plan of 1984 can be seen as a turning point in the reinvigoration of 
tariff reform. The decision to eliminate tariff quotas and local content plans and gradually move 
to a tariff only regime sent a clear message that even in the then highly protected automotive 
industry, tariff reform was possible. A subsequent decision to slash chemical tariffs was a 
further reinforcement of this message. The major devaluation of the Australian dollar which took 
place in 1985 led to sustained calls for general tariff reductions. In the event, the Hawke 
government, through its 1988 decisions on automotive tariffs and the general program of tariff 
reductions (which set out a program to reduce tariffs to 15/10 per cent) made manifest to all the 
reality of tariff reform. 
 
The Whitlam Government Contribution 
 
The Whitlam government has not gone into the history books as good economic managers. 
Their management of the difficult macro-economy, heavily influenced by the first oil shock and a 
lot of outdated economic policy baggage, was less than impressive. It was only in the early part 
of 1975 with the establishment of the Expenditure Review Committee of Cabinet that steps 
were taken to put in place more appropriate economic policies. 
 
Nevertheless, one area where the Whitlam government can take credit is for having started the 
ball rolling on tariff reform, both through the establishment of the Industries Assistance 
Commission and the 25 per cent tariff cut. These positives more than offset the back sliding that 
took place in 1974 / 5. 
 
At least in the area of tariff reform the Whitlam government’s actions and the rhetoric of the 
Prime Minister contributed to a more modern view of Australia positioning itself for active 
engagement with the world economy and a willingness to meet the challenge of becoming 
internationally competitive, not just in resource based industries but trade exposed industries in 
general. 
 
In retrospect, the 25 per cent tariff cut almost certainly got more blame for the recession of 1974 
/ 5 than it deserved. Careful analysis by Fred Gruen and others subsequently demonstrated that 
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the wage explosion of 1973 / 4 had a much greater effect on loss of jobs in manufacturing 
industry than the 25 per cent tariff cut. 
 
To use Gough Whitlam’s words, the ‘nervous nellies’ were eventually proved wrong. By the mid-
1980s both themain political parties had embraced tariff reform as an essential part of a range 
of policies designed to position Australia for active participation in the global economy. 
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